Public Law: Constitutional Law by Reynard, Charles A.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 12 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1950-1951 Term
January 1952
Public Law: Constitutional Law
Charles A. Reynard
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Charles A. Reynard, Public Law: Constitutional Law, 12 La. L. Rev. (1952)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol12/iss2/13
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
II. Public Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
A half dozen cases of significance involving constitutional
issues were disposed of during the term. One of these was a tax
case1 presenting a due process question and is discussed in the
section on State and Local Taxation. Of the remaining five, three
called for the application of established principles of constitu-
tional law while the other two were concerned with the inierpre-
tation and application of special provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution.
In State v. Garrett2 the constitutional issue3 involved was the
basic one of the litigant's standing or interest requisite to chal-
lenge the validity of a legislative enactment. The defendant in
that case had been convicted of violating the provisions of a local
option liquor ordinance. By way of defense, inter alia, he pointed
to the fact that the ordinance, in addition to prohibiting the sale
bf alcoholic beverages (for which he had been tried and con-
victed) also prohibited its possession for sale, whereas the propo-
sition originally submitted and approved by the electors had not
authorized the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting such posses-
sion. The court disposed of the objection summarily with the
brief statement "that since the defendant was charged with and
convicted for only the sale of intoxicating liquor he is without
right presently to question the appearance in the ordinance of
the words 'possess for sale', they constituting mere surplusage
insofar as this prosecution is concerned." 4 Here, then, we have
an application of the salutary principle, adopted by the judiciary
in the exercise of appropriate self-restraint as a limitation upon
the power of judicial review, that before a person will be per-
mitted to challenge the validity of an enactment, he must show
that he has a fundamental right which will be infringed by its
enforcement against him.5
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Bahry v. West Ascension Consol. Drainage District, 218 La. 1028, 51 So.
2d 614 (1951), discussed infra p. 172.
2. 218 La. 538, 50 So. 2d 24 (1950).
3. Another, and more controverted issue of the case, involved a point of
statutory interpretation.
4. 218 La. 538, 545, 50 So. 2d 24, 26-27 (1950).
5. The principle is as old as the doctrine of judicial review itself. It has
been recently discussed and applied in the following cases in the Supreme
Court of the United States: United States v. C.I.O., 335 US. 106 (1948); Coff-
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It was perhaps only coincidental that during the same year
when the so-called Kefauver Committee of the United States
Senate was encountering similar difficulties, the court should be
asked to intervene in contempt of court proceedings on behalf
of a witness before a grand jury investigating charges of public
bribery who had refused to answer the question, "Did you ...
collect any money from the owners of slot machines ... ?" State
v. Rodrigues" presented these facts, and the relator, having unsuc-
cessfully argued three points of defense to the trial court, sought
an order to stay the sentence imposed by the trial court. The
sentence was affirmed on all three grounds. The relator first
contended that even if his action constituted contempt, it had
been committed outside the presence of the court, entitling him
to the benefits of the notice and hearing provisions made applic-
able in such cases by statute 7 and which, in his case, had not
been granted. This contention was found to be without merit by
reason of the court's conclusion that a grand jury is a "constituent
part" of the court, with the result that contumacious action before
it is tantamount to similar conduct before the court itself-a con-
clusion which seems amply supported by authorities from other
jurisdictions as well as the Louisiana jurisprudence.
The relator's two remaining defenses were predicated upon
the state constitutional provisions relating to self-incrimination
reading as follows:
"Article I....
"Section 11. No person shall be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding
that may subject him to criminal prosecution, except as
otherwise provided in this Constitution. . .
"Article XIX....
"Section 13. Any person may be compelled to testify in
man v. Breeze Corporations, 323 U.S. 316 (1945) and Anderson National Bank v.
Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). There is no doubt that the doctrine has applica-
tion to municipal or parochial ordinances, as one of the most frequently cited
federal cases involved an ordinance of the City of Louisville, Kentucky.
(Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 [1917].) While it is universally conceded
that the principle, like most others, is subject to numerous exceptions (as, for
example, where the public interest in its enforcement demands, or where the
entire statute will be invalidated if the challenged, but presently inapplicable
provision falls, or where the jurisdiction of the court in the proceedings,
depends upon the issue of constitutionality involved, etc.), none of them was
present in the instant case and there is every reason to regard the decision as
a proper one.
6. 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756 (1951).
7. La. R.S. (1950) 15:11.
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any lawful proceeding against any one who may be charged
with having committed the offense of bribery and shall not
be permitted to withhold his testimony upon the ground
that it may incriminate him or subject him to public infamy;
but such testimony shall not afterwards be used against him
in any judicial proceedings, except for perjury in giving
such testimony."
The relator contended that his case should be governed by the
ordinary rule provided in Article I, Section 11, rather than the
exception contained in Article XIX, Section 13, first, because he
had not been informed that any person had been "charged in an
affidavit, bill of information, or indictment" with having com-
mitted bribery, and second, that the section, if applicable, does
not afford complete immunity against prosecutions for other but
related crimes and hence amounts to no immunity at all.
The court met the first of these objections by pointing out
that acceptance of the relator's construction of the section would
unduly restrict the provision to trials of accused persons before
judges or petit juries and render meaningless the broader phrase
"in any lawful proceeding" (which would include grand jury
investigations) found therein, a conclusion which seems wholly
realistic and most probably accords with the intent of the framers.
It was the second of these objections, the contention that the
exculpatory clause would not relieve the relator from prosecu-
tions for other but related crimes, which seemed to give the court
the greatest difficulty. As a matter of fact, the court's opinion
furnishes no categorical answer to the question thus posed by the
relator's contention. The court might reasonably have interpreted
the phrase "such testimony shall not afterwards be used against
him in any judicial proceedings" (italics supplied), to mean what
it literally says, thereby conferring complete immunity contrary
to the relator's contention. There is good reason to suspect that
the court subscribed to this view because it cited with approval
a Pennsylvania case interpreting an identically worded provision
in the constitution of that state to confer absolute immunity.8
However, the opinion of the court, rather than adopting this inter-
8. In re Kelly's Contested Election, 200 Pa. 430, 50 Atl. 248 (1901). There
the court said: "Assuming that the witness' answer would disclose the fact
that he used money to purchase the votes of certain electors, his answer could
not be used against him in any legal proceeding. . . . The most that he could
suffer would be that odium which attaches to moral turpitude .... His state-
ment subjects him to no higher penalty than moral degradation, which is not
a subject of criminal prosecution."
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pretation as the authoritative construction of our own constitu-
tional provision, met the issue by a kind of confession and avoid-
ance technique, relying. upon the well established principle that
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution does not apply to state proceedings. 9 On this
score the court's language leaves little room for doubt, for it said:
"We fully agree with the conclusion made by the trial
judge in his return to the writ, in which he said: 'The con-
clusion is inescapable that our State has the right to grant
immunity to its citizens from being compelled to give testi-
mony that will incriminate them, or to withhold that right,
or to give it under certain conditions or subject to certain
exceptions. The people of this State have chosen to give it
subject to the exception with which we are here con-
cerned....'" (Italics supplied.) 10
It is clear, therefore, that the trial judge shared the relator's view
that the section would not shield him from prosecutions for other
but related crimes. There was no claim, nor is there support for
the view that exposure to mere moral opprobrium constitutes
incrimination.1 And the supreme court, by placing its imprim-
atur upon the trial court's conclusion casts doubt upon the alter-
native construction which would confer complete immunity.
It may be said that the result is inconsequential, as it com-
pels the testimony of recalcitrant witnesses regardless of the
interpretative route pursued. It is submitted, however, that if
the constitutional framers truly intended the complete immunity
suggested here (and established in Pennsylvania) witnesses
should be apprized of that fact at the earliest opportunity in order
to assist the public and its officials in their attempts to pursue and
suppress crime.
The only other case of the term to involve general principles
of constitutional law was Cooper v. Lykes' 2 in which the defen-
dant challenged A legislative's act altering the pre-existing law of
prescription applicable to mineral interests on the grounds that it
(1) was an ex post facto law, and (2) impaired the obligation of
contract, contrary to the provisions of both state and federal con-
9. The court cited the early case of Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908). The principle was most recently affirmed in the controversial five to
four decision in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
10. 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756, 762 (1951).
11. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
12. 218 La. 251, 49 So. 2d 3 (1950).
13. La. Act 232 of 1944, La. R.S. (1950) 9:5805.
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stitutions.' 4 Both contentions are so demonstrably untenable as
to evoke sympathy for the court which must devote valuable time
to the consideration and decision of the case. For more than a
century and a half it has been the settled jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of the United States that the ex post facto clause
is a restriction upon the legislative powers of the states in the
enactment of criminal laws only.'" Similarly, for more than a
century the same court has uniformly held that statutes of limi-
tation of reasonable duration are valid, affect only the remedy of
enforcement, and do not impair the obligation of contracts or
rights and interests to which they apply.1
6
The two remaining cases decided during the term called for
the construction of particular provisions of the State Constitu-
tion. The first of these, Fouchaux v. Board of Commissioners of
Port of New Orleans,I' was a suit against an agency of the state,
filed after permission to do so had been granted by an act of the
legislature.'8 By way of defense, it was asserted that the legisla-
ture had failed to conform with the requirements of Article 3,
Section 35, of the State Constitution, which, at the time of its
adoption as well as at the time of the filing of this case, provided
that such acts "shall provide a method of procedure and the effect
of the judgments which may be rendered therein."' 9 The rele-
vant provisions of the act are set forth in the margin.20 The court,
on the original hearing, by a five to two decision, sustained the
validity of the act declaring, first, that there was compliance with
the'constitutional requirement that a method of procedure be
prescribed when the legislature said that it should be "the same
as in suits between private litigants," and second, that the effect
of any judgment recovered had been adequately dealt with in
Section 3. The latter section was construed to mean "that, should
plaintiff obtain a judgment . . . a legislative Act, . . . or some
14. U.S. Const. Art I, § 10; La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 15.
15. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
16. Hawkins v. Barney, 30 U.S. 362 (1831).
17. 219 La. 354, 53 So. 2d 128 (1951).
18. La. Act 365 of 1946.
19. This section, as subsequently noted, has since been amended.
20. Section 1 simply authorizes the filing of suit against the defendant.
Section 2. "That, except as otherwise herein expressly provided, the pro-
cedure in said suit or suits shall be the same as in suits between private
litigants."
Section 3. "That nothing in this Act shall be construed as conferring on
the said Douglas Foucheaux any different or greater claim or cause of action
than he had before the passage of this Act, the purpose of this Act being
merely to waive the State's and the said Board of Commissioners' immunity
from suit insofar as the suit or suits hereby authorized are concerned."
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other appropriation by the Board would have to be obtained for
its satisfaction." 21 Chief Justice Fournet dissented on separate
grounds. Justice Moise disagreed with the majority opinion on
both points of. procedure and effect, and on rehearing, wrote the
majority opinion for a court divided four to two with the Chief
Justice absent, reversing the earlier opinion. Justices McCaleb
and Hawthorne dissented, adhering to the views expressed in
the earlier opinion, written by the former.
Although one encounters some difficulty with the decision
on the procedure point (the proviso that procedure applicable to
private litigants would seem to suffice, particularly if one sub-
scribes wholeheartedly to the presumption of constitutionality
and indulges the maxim that it is a court's duty to adopt from
alternative interpretations the one which will sustain constitu-
tionality), there is much to be said for the view that the act was
deficient for failure to prescribe the effect of any judgment to be
recovered by the plaintiff. As Justice Moise points out on rehear-
ing, the court itself on first hearing had implied that at least two
effects might be accorded any such judgment-(1) that it be
satisfied by legislative appropriation, or (2) that it be paid by
board appropriation. The resolution of that alternative is a mat-
ter in which the public has an interest, and it is not too much to
say that this is the kind of decision which the framers had in
mind when they adopted the provision in question, making it the
duty of the legislature to say precisely what the effect should be.
Much of the doubt and uncertainty which would normally attend
the decision, and others which preceded it, have now been
resolved by an amendment to the constitutional provision itself22
which definitely provides that procedure shall be the same as in
private litigation, enjoining the legislature to provide the method
of citing the state and to designate the court, and clearly defines
the effect of judgments in such cases.
The final decision of the term to involve the constitution was
Jones v. State Board of Education,23 a taxpayer's suit to restrain
the defendants (including the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University) from carrying out the provisions of several
statutes enacted by the 1950 session of the legislature. The enact-
ments in question expanded the curricula of two of the state's
junior colleges, converted them into four year colleges, removed
them from the direction and control of the Board of Supervisors
21. 219 La. 354, 53 So. 2d 128, 129 (1951).
22. La. Act 385 of 1946, approved November 5, 1946.
23. 219 La. 630, 53 So. 2d 792 (1951).
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of Louisiana State University and placed them within the juris-
diction and control of the State Board of Education. Plaintiff,
relying upon Article IV, Section 14, of the Louisiana Constitution
which provides in part that "No educational . . . institution . . .
shall be established by the State, except upon a vote of two-thirds
of the members elected to each house of the Legislature," pointed
to the fact that none of the legislation in question had received a
two-thirds majority, contended that the legislation provided for
the establishment of educational institutions, and hence was void.
Although the trial court had agreed with the plaintiff's
view of the matter, the supreme court reversed, choosing to
regard the legislation as a permissible adjustment or enlarge-
ment of already existing state institutions of learning. It reviewed
the physical and legislative history of the two institutions affected,
which were appropriately brought into the state's educational
system (one having been created, the other adopted as a going
concern, both by legislation receiving the required two-thirds
majority) and concluded that there was no merit to the plaintiff's
contention that this previous legislation did nothing more than
create two junior colleges. They properly created state "educa-
tional institutions" which are the kind of establishments to which
the constitutional provision refers. From that point, the court
concluded that the plain and unambiguous language "leaves us
convinced that the educational institutions therein contemplated
are not limited to the higher institutions of learning but to State
educational institutions of any character regardless of how they
may be designated." 24 By thus viewing the matter as a simple
re-allocation of educational functions and an enlargement of
activity of existing institutions, the legislature could be forgiven
non-compliance with Article IV, Section 14, which, by its terms,
applies only to legislation establishing such institutions. The
result seems sound and is reached, as the court itself remarked,
without resort to the established principle that courts will not
declare acts of legislatures unconstitutional unless it is clearly
shown that they contravene applicable provisions of the con-
stitution.
LABOR LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
In one of its infrequent decisions involving organized labor,
the court last term affirmed the dismissal of a suit for damages
24. 219 La. 630, 53 So. 2d 792, 797 (1951).
' Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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